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LIMITATION OF WARRANTY UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
RICHARD D. CUDAHY*
That the law of warranty is, and probably always will be, in a state
of flux is hardly news.' Part of this instability, or dynamic quality if
you will, is represented by the attempt on one hand to increase the
burden of warranty liability-to find implied warranties more easily,
to restrict the requirement of privity-and, on the other hand, to devise
means, through disclaimers, limitations of remedy and other like de-
vices, to restrict the burden of warranty liability. The efforts to restrict
liability through contractual disclaimer may reasonably be expected to
grow as traditional limitations, such as that of privity, are broken down.
For this reason, although there is no reason to expect that enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code in Wisconsin will effect far-reaching
or radical changes in the law governing liability for breach of sales
warranties, lawyers will be well advised to acquaint themselves with
the rather detailed provisions of the Code governing warranties and,
in particular those sections pertaining to disclaimer, exclusion or modi-
fication of warranties and limitation of remedy for breach of warranty.
These sections (some details aside) are without specific precedent in
the Uniform Sales Act except for the general provisions of the Uni-
form Sales Act, section 71,2 which allows modification of rights and
duties under sales contracts by agreement of the parties. The purpose
of this article is to analyze disclaimer, exclusion or modification of
warranty and limitation of remedy for breach of warranty of quality
under the Code and to summarize in what respects changes in current
law seem to have been effected. Warranties of title and their disclaimer,
governed by Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-312, will not be
covered here.
Apart from changes which may be more or less clearly deduced
from the new statute, we may assume that the break with the prior
statutory framework will provide an opportunity of a sort for courts
* Lecturer in Law, Marquette University Law School; B.S., 1948, United States
Military Academy; LL.B., 1955, Yale Law School.
1 Ezer, The Ibnpact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law
of Sales Warranties, 8 U. C. L. A. L. REv. 281 (1961).
2 WIs. STAT. §121.71 (1961).
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to pursue their inclinations in departing from precedents which they
already regard as undesirable. Thus in Hall v. Everett Motors Inc.,3
wherein an automobile sold under a standard manufacturer's warranty
of replacement and repair of defective parts coupled with disclaimer
of implied warranties, was damaged by fire, possibly attributable to
a defective part, the court upheld the disclaimer and denied recovery
of consequential damages but said:
This is not the kind of an agreement which commends itself
to the sense of justice of the court. It really means that the auto-
mobile is sold 'as is' subject to the honest satisfaction of the non-
resident manufacturer that the defect was something for which
it is liable. We do not need to decide whether, to obtain the bene-
fit of this narrow warranty, the buyer was under the obligation
first to return the ruined automobile to the factory, wherever that
is. We hope should a similar case arise under the Uniform
Commercial Code we shall not be so bound by precedent. 4
The questions presented in sales warranty cases involving disclaimer,
exclusion, modification and limitation of remedies are governed pri-
marily by Uniform Commercial Code section 2-202 (pertaining to parol
evidence), section 2-302 (pertaining to unconscionability), section 2-316
(pertaining to exclusion or modification of warranties), section 2-317
(pertaining to cumulation and conflict of warranties), section 2-718
(pertaining to liquidation or limitation of damages) and section 2-719
(pertaining to contractual modification and limitation of remedy).- Of
these, sections 2-718 and 2-719 apply generally to remedies for breach
of sales contracts, but, of course, this subject matter includes remedies
for breach of warranty. 6
Section 2-302 (which provides courts with" express power to meas-
ure the "bargain" of the parties against their own informed standard
of justice 7 and eliminates the necessity of recourse to circuitous tech-
niques to void transactions which are not true bargains at all) is gen-
erally applicable to all sales contracts and portions thereof. Section
s 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E. 2d 107 (1960).
4 Id. at 434, 165 N.E. 2d 109.
5 As enacted in Wisconsin, the Code sections pertinent herein differ only in
some formal details from the 1962 Official Draft as proposed by The Ameri-
can Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, referred to throughout this article. The corresponding
Wisconsin statute numbers are as follows:







6 Section 316(4) expressly refers to §§2-718 and 2-719.
7 But §2-302(2) contemplates that the courts shall, in determining an issue
of unconscionability, hear evidence of commercial practice and commercial
experience bearing on the question.
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2-302 itself may be operative over and above, and independently of,
any more specific Code provision seeking to promote fairness in a par-
ticular situation. Thus, one commentator has stated with respect to the
effect of the section on automobile warranties:
In an action for breach of warranty in a state without the
Code, a court would probably have no recourse except to recog-
nize Dealer's defense based on the disclaimer, for the contract's
language leaves little room for interpretation. Nor would an
argument based on lack of mutual assent be available. But under
section 2-302 relief from this oppressive contract is more easily
obtained. Even assuming that the disclaiming warranty meets
the standards imposed by Section 2-316, Buyer would still have
an argument based on conscionability. If he can prove that free
choice was precluded because of a uniformity among leading car
manufacturers in the type of warranty offered, the otherwise
valid disclaimer should be stricken under Section 2-302.8
The Official Comment to section 2-302 casts some doubt on this
hopeful interpretation stating that, "The principle is one of the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise . . .and not of disturbance
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." [Emphasis
added] Uniformity of automobile warranties would presumably in-
volve the "allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power"
rather than "oppression," although the latter might merely be a moral
characterization of the former (which sounds in economics). "Unfair
surprise," of course, does not necessarily relate to disparity of bargain-
ing power, and "oppression" probably refers to the injustice worked
by ambiguous or concealed provisions and has no direct relation to the
balance of bargaining power.10
Morever, the concept of unconscionability is incorporated in express
terms in section 2-719(3) governing consequential damages. Since the
whole problem of unconscionability through inadequate notice to the
buyer, through disparity in bargaining power of the parties or other-
wise is basic to the specific questions raised by disclaimer, exclusion or
modification of warranties and by limitation of remedies for breach of
warranties, the mamidate provided by section 2-302 to refuse to enforce
unconscionable contracts, even though broad and necessarily ill-defined,
must permeate the analysis of all such questions.
As the current Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code
now make clear, the scheme of the Code is to provide in sections 2-316
and 2-317 for the exclusion or modification of warranties (and under
8 Comment, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 401, 420 (1961) ; See Note, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 607 (1961).9 UNiFoRms CommERcIAL CODE §2-302, comment 1 (Official Text 1962). But this
comment also sets forth a conceivably inconsistent standard in that the "basic
test is whether ... the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscion-
able.. . ." (Emphasis added.)
10 See Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 630, 632 (1961).
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those sections it may be found that a warranty has not in fact been cre-
ated) ; and in section 2-719 (or section 2-718) to provide for the limita-
tion of remedies for breaches of warranties which have, in fact, been
created." In the analysis of a disclaimer problem, therefore, the analyst
must first consult sections 2-312 through 2-317 to determine whether
liability under a warranty exists and, if so, whether the remedy for its
breach has been validly limited under section 2-719 (or section 2-718).
In practice, the two problems will usually be found to be intimately
related.
I. Disclaimer of Express Warranties
A. ANALYSIS
In the 1952 Draft of the Commercial Code, it was, in effect, im-
possible to disclaim express warranties. In that Draft, section 2-316(1)
read: "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming
it are inoperative."' 12 The intent of this language presumably was to
preclude entirely the disclaimer of express warranties and to leave the
seller to the protection provided by limitation of remedy under sections
2-718 or 2-719 only. Professor Honnold, in his commentary provided
for the Report of the New York Law Revision Commission in 1955,
discussed the alleged difficulties of construction of the then language
of section 2-316(1) at some length and concluded with the following
comment which included a suggestion for a revised version of subsec-
tion (1).
It must be granted, however, that the foregoing reading of
the Code is not free from doubt. The difficulty is posed by the
peculiar language of Section 2-316(1) that 'if the agreement
creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inopera-
tive.' The difficulty is enhanced since this language suggests that
the agreement is to be broken apart and the express warranty
construed without reference to the disclaimer clause, whereas the
basic theory which would preserve the express agreement must
be the diametrically opposite view that each part of the agree-
ment must be given some effect. If the thought underlying this
provision is that suggested in this memorandum, it probably could
be more readily communicated by language like the following:
(1) To the extent possible, an agreement shall be so construed
as to give effect to each part, and words or conduct which other-
wise would create an express warranty shall not be denied effect
by words of disclaimer. 3
11 UNIFORM COM MER-CIAL CODE §2-316, comment 2, and §2-719, comment 3 (Of-
ficial Text 1962).
12 UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE §2-316 (1) (Official Text 1952).
1 31 Honnold, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT OF N. Y. LAW
REVISION COMM. 406 (1955), referring also, by way of footnote, to Alaska
Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947) where-
in judge Frank recorded his opinion that the then current version of§2-316(1)
was inconsistent with existing law and Judge Clark's view to the contrary.
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After much pulling and hauling, the section finally emerged in the
1958 Draft in the heavily clouded, if not meaningless, form which is
now enshrined in the statutes as follows:
Section 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an ex-
press warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreason-
able.' 4
The section thus seems to say that, if there is no parol evidence
problem, an express warranty will be given as much effect against a
disclaimer as reasonable interpretation will permit and that, in any
event, the warranty will not be limited or negated if that result is
"unreasonable." Courts are thus instructed to use their best efforts to
salvage an express warranty, or at least some significant aspect of it,
by reconciling it in some "reasonable" manner with language of nega-
tion or limitation. If the language of negation or limitation is not
"reasonably" reconcilable with the warranty, then the disclaiming lan-
guage must give way. If only because of the verbal miasma created in
the latter Drafts the current version represents a considerable stride
(backward) from Professor Llewelyn's straightforward 1952 Draft.15
In the event that the express warranty is subject to attack on the
grounds that it is excluded by the parol evidence rule, a new set of
considerations, incorporated in section 2-202 of the Code, become
relevant. Parol warranties may be excluded as under the prior law,
especially where a merger clause is present.' 8 The Code, however, at-
tempts to make clear that the court in the ordinary case is to consider
all relevant extrinsic evidence (including evidence of promises, repre-
sentations, prior dealings, trade usage, reliance of the buyer and other
matters going to the entire commercial setting) before deciding whether
a written contract is an integration not to be varied by parol evidence.' 7
With respect to consistent additional terms, the "intent" of the parties
as it appears in the total business context is the controlling considera-
tion, and the written agreement may be explained or supplemented by
'4 UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE §2-316 (1).
15 The late Karl Llewelyn, whose force of character matched his intellect, was
the principal draftsman of the Sales Article (article 2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
16 See Ady v. Barnett, 142 Wis. 18, 124 N.W. 1061 (1910) ; Valley Refrigeration
Co. v. Lange Co., 242 Wis. 466, 8 N.W. 2d 294 (1943).
'7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-202, official comment (Official Text 1962);
Note, Warranties, Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 CoLum. L.
REv. 858 (1953); Patterson, 1 Study of the Uniform Commercial Code,
REPORT OF N. Y. LAW REVISIoN COmm. 597, 598 (1955), states that the chief
purpose of §2-202 is to "'loosen up' the presumption that a writing (apparently
complete) is a total integration ....
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such terms unless the parties intended the writing to be complete and
exclusive. In addition section 2-202 departs from Wisconsin law in
that evidence of course of dealing,'8 usage of the trade or course of
performance' 9 may be accorded weight without a showing of "ambigu-
ity" in the written contract.
20
In the leading Wisconsin disclaimer case, Valley Refrigeration Co.
v. Lange Co.,2' an alleged warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
was excluded by a merger clause (invoking the parol evidence rule)
to the effect that the sales contract contained the entire proposed agree-
ment between the parties and that no agreements, promises or un-
derstandings not contained in the written agreement were to have
effect. Under the particular facts of the case, there seems to be nothing
in section 2-202 which would produce a different result under the Uni-
form Commercial Code. As will be shown later, however, a different
result based on the application of the Code to implied warranties might
now be reached (assuming the transaction, in fact, created a warranty
of fitness under section 2-315).
In Ady v. Barnett," the buyer, as a defense to an action for the
purchase price of certain goods, claimed that the goods were bought with
the understanding that they were not to be paid for unless sold. The
court held that, in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, proof of
such antecedent or contemporaneous agreements between the parties
could not be received. Under the Code, evidence as to these matters
ought to be received to show whether or not the written agreement was
in fact what the parties intended to constitute their entire deal. Again
under the facts of the case there is nothing to indicate that a different
result would have been reached under the Code, but there would have
been greater freedom to prove or disprove the fact of integration by
written contract.
Even though the express warranty is shown to have survived the
exclusionary efforts of the seller under section 2-316, the parties are
able to limit remedies under section 2-719. Several lower-court de-
cisions in Pennsylvania indicate how this result has been reached under
is Course of dealing (conduct of parties in prior transactions) is defined in
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-205 (1).
19 Course of performance (conduct with respect to prior deliveries under the
instant contract) is defined in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-208(1). Course
of performance controls both course of dealing and usage of trade, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §2-208(2). As between the latter, course of dealing con-
trols, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-205(4).
20 Cf. Engeldinger v. Stevens, 132 Wis. 423, 112 N.W. 507 (1907) (absent
ambiguity in the order, evidence of custom of dealer not admissible); Chi-
cago, I. & L. Ry. v. Peterson, 168 Wis. 193, 169 N.W. 558 (1918) (proof
of alleged custom negating primary liability of shipper for freight charges
not admissible).




the Code in effect in that state. In Magar v. Life-Time, Inc.,23 an action
for breach of contract, not involving personal injury, in which de-
fendant (who undertook to plaster the four exterior walls of plain-
tiff's house) allegedly failed to provide material up to sample and to
apply the material properly, language limiting the home-owner's remedy
was held enforceable. Since this was not a sales case, the court did not
directly apply the Uniform Commercial Code but indicated that the
provisions of sections 2-719 were relevant by analogy. The language of
warranty and limitation of remedy, which was upheld, was as follows:
Contractor guarantees that all materials furnished by it will
be of standard quality free from defects and will be installed or
applied in a good and workmanlike manner for a period of one
year from date of installation. The liability of the Contractor for
defective material or installation under this guarantee is hereby
limited to the replacement or correction of said defective material
and/or installation, and no other claims or demands whatsoever
shall be made upon, or required to be allowed by the Contractor.24
Section 2-719(3) pertaining to the limitation or exclusion of conse-
quential damages permits such limitation or exclusion so long as the
result is not "unconscionable." The unconscionability concept is given
more specific application through the provision that limitations upon
consequential damages for personal injury inflicted by consumer goods
are to be deemed prima facie unconscionable. The distinction made by
the Code between limitation of damages for personal injury and those
for commercial loss has no specific or express precedent in Wisconsin,
but would seem to follow the trend of judicial decisions, particularly
in the food cases (where disclaimers or limitations of remedy are sel-
dom resorted to) 25 and the automobile cases (where such restrictions
have been under attack).
The Wisconsin leading precedent in the field of modification of rem-
edy is middle-aged but appears consistent with section 2-719. Thus, in
Renne v. Volk 6 the sales contract provided that, in the event buyer
instructed seller not to ship, the seller had an option to ignore the in-
struction and deliver the goods to a common carrier for shipment.
Based on a repudiation by the buyer and shipment under this provision
by the seller, seller brought suit for the purchase price of an acetylene
23 187 Pa. Super. 143, 144 A. 2d 747 (1958).
241d. at 146, 144 A. 2d at 748; cf. Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44
Erie Leg. J. 51 (Pa. 1961), 3 B. C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 602, 611 (1963)(parts' replacement wairanty and disclaimer of all other warranties insuf-
ficiently specific under Uniform Commercial Code 1952 Draft to avoid con-
sequential damages). Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 203, 70 York Leg.
Rec. 105 (1956) (reading the unconscionability provisions of §2-719 in con-
nection with §2-718); Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi and Sons, 193 Pa.
Super. 1, 162 A. 2d 263 (1960) (parts' replacement warranty and exclusion
of consequential damages upheld under Uniform Sales Act).
25 Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 453, 458 (1961).
26 188 Wis. 508, 205 N.W. 385 (1926).
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farm lighting plant. The court, in upholding seller's claim for the pur-
chase price, held that the buyer might validly waive his right to cancel
the contract (and thereby also waive his right to limit seller to a remedy
in damages). Although the case does not, strictly speaking, concern
itself with a breach of warranty and, in effect, results in a liberalization
rather than in a limitation of remedies, it is clearly consistent with the
principle incorporated in section 2-719 that the parties may, within rea-
son, modify the remedies provided them by statute.
In the area of warranties of description, the Code, as to disclaimer,
does seem to provide the basis for some changes in existing Wisconsin
law. This conclusion is based on the classification by section 2-313(6)
of such warranties as express warranties coupled with the barriers
raised by section 2-316(1) against limitation or negation of express
warranties.27 Since, as indicated above, the meaning of section 2-316(1)
is murky, its effect on warranties of description partakes of its general
obscurity. Perhaps, however, the scheme of these sections would result
in the overruling of the Wisconsin "seed" cases (which have their
counterparts in other states as well).
In the leading case of Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co.25
the seller contracted to furnish seed for "Advancer" peas, and, upon
the crop's being planted and the peas sufficiently matured, it was found
that they did not conform to the contract description. The contract of
sale contained a provision that the seller gave no warranty, express or
implied, that the seed peas furnished would conform to the contract
description. The court, in holding for the seller on a counterclaim by
defendant-buyer for consequential damages for loss of the crop con-
tracted to the defendant canning company by its sub-vendee farmers,
gave full effect to the disclaimer. In so holding, the court said:
Plaintiff plainly undertook to relieve itself from liability in
case of intermixture, and defendant agreed that it should be
relieved. * * * If it be conceded that the contract is one-sided,
it must also be conceded that the parties had a right to make a
one-sided contract if they saw fit.2"
This is a forthright statement, if ever there was one, of the prin-
ciples of freedom of contract. Unfortunately, however, the court makes
little attempt to analyze how much freedom, if any, the buyer had to
purchase "Advancer" seeds without such a disclaimer. There is evi-
dence that it was the custom of seed suppliers to disclaim warranties of
description. 30 This being the case, we are probably not talking about a
27 Section 2-313(b) provides: "Any description of the goods which is made part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of
the goods shall conform to the description."
28 147 Wis. 166, 132 N.W. 902 (1911).
29 Id. at 169, 132 N.W. at 903.
30 See Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P. 2d 270 (1932); Ross v.
Northrup, King & Co., 156 Wis. 327, 144 N.W. 1124 (1914).
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dickered deal at all but about the right of the seed industry to impose
the risk of misdescription upon individual buyers rather than distribut-
ing it to the agricultural community through absorption of this risk into
its own costs and a consequent upward price adjustment to all buyers.
Under modern conditions, at least, this risk could presumably be
equalized through recourse to liability insurance.
Ross v. Northrup, King and Co.31 reaches the same result as the
Leonard Seed3 2 case and turns both upon express disclaimer and upon
general custom of the trade not to warrant. These cases are strongly
influenced by the idea of liability through fault since the essential char-
acteristics of seeds are latent and incapable of verification until the
seeds are planted, germinate and sprout. Therefore, it is argued that
the seller should be permitted to avoid warranty responsibility for the
description of the seeds, which he could not reasonably be expected to
assure even with the highest degree of care. As noted above, risk-
distribution theory would ignore this rationale (which, in any event,
departs from the concept of warranty as imposing strict liability) and
would spread the risk to the entire agricultural community through
liability insurance. Presumably, section 2-316 could be used to imple-
ment this latter theory and overrule the Wisconsin cases since limita-
tion or negation of a warranty of description of seeds would seem to
be "unreasonable" within the meaning of section 2-316(1) unless buyer
and seller were professionals of roughly equivalent bargaining power."
On the other hand, equivalence of bargaining power might be shown to
exist in varying degrees in either of the Wisconsin cases cited since
neither case involved farmers as buyers bargaining for themselves.
Under section 2-719 (or section 2-718) a seed supplier might per-
haps conscionably limit consequential damages resulting from misde-
scription since one of the arguments for exculpating sellers in this sit-
uation is the need for protecting them against large losses resulting
from relatively small purchases. Again, seemingly, the availability of
liability insurance should be a governing consideration.
B. SUMMARY (EXPRESS WARRANTIES)
Thus, in considering the application of the Uniform Commercial Code
to a problem of disclaimer of express warranty, unless a parol evidence
33 156 Wis. 327, 144 N.W. 1124 (1914).
32 Note 28 supra.
33 See Ezer, supra note 1, at 313-314. The door is still slightly ajar for dis-
claimers of warranties of description under the Codd since the Official Com-
ments state: "This [limitation on general disclaimer of warranties of descrip-
tion] is not intended to mean that the parties, if they consciously desire,
cannot make their own bargain as they wish. But in determining what they
have agreed upon good faith is a factor and consideration should be given
to the fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended to be
exchanged for a pseudo-obligation." UNIFoRM CmmERClIAL CODE §2-313,
comment 4 (Official Text 1962).
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problem exists, the strong bias of the statute is to give as strong effect
as possible to the warranty in the face of language of attempted dis-
claimer. No doubt this bias is not expressed as unequivocally as the
rule incorporated in the 1952 Draft, but even with the prolix and
opaque language now enacted into la*, the courts will be more than
likely to observe the bias by so construing an express warranty and
disclaimer together as to give maximum effect to the warranty and
none, if possible, to the disclaimer. Certainly, and particularly to the
extent that the parol evidence rule is not involved, the policy of the
Code to preclude the disclaimer of express warranties furthers the
rational distribution of risks, as well as, in the usual case, being in the
interest of fair play between the parties. The seller should not, as a
general principle, be permitted to take away with one hand under the
table what he proffers with the other hand above the table, although
there are still cases where it may be both rational and equitable to
disclaim the effect of language which might otherwise be construed as
an "express warranty." 34 The Code language is flexible (or obscure)
enough to allow for the latter situations.
Insofar as the parol evidence rule may alone, or in conjunction with
a disclaimer, limit the effect of an express warranty, the Code, in sec-
tion 2-202, has sought to reduce the chances of nullification of the war-
ranty by over-technical application of the rule. The intent of the parties
in the context of the entire commercial setting is to be considered in
determining whether consistent parol warranties should bind the seller.
Thus, the Code contemplates that, in the ordinary case, relevant evi-
dence of promises, representations, prior dealings, trade usages, and
reliance of the buyer will be considered by the court before deciding
whether the written agreement constitutes a full, complete and ex-
clusive statement of the terms of the agreement such as to exclude con-
sistent additional terms.3 Section 2-202 allows the explanation or sup-
plementing of the written contract by course of dealing or usage of
trade or by course of performance without a showing that the docu-
ment is ambiguous on its face. All these are aspects of the Code which
further the widely accepted policy of strict construction of disclaimers
and which seem to make significantly more difficult the path of the
disclaimer of express warranties, whether such warranties are written
or parol or imposed by usage.
II. Disclaimer of Implied Warranties: The Code
In the area of disclaimer of implied warranties the Code spells out
in a fashion unknown to the Sales Act (but not necessarily foreign in
result to the case law decided under it) certain rules primarily designed
34 The more real is the freedom to contract the more available should be the
option to disclaim.
3 Note, supra note 17, at 871.
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to invalidate the "surprise" or "fine print" disclaimer. These rules do
not, and, generalized as they are, cannot, directly confront the problem
of disclaimers resulting from gross disparity of bargaining power of
the parties; however, the provisions of the Code which would require
all disclaimers (whether or not unilaterally imposed) to be more con-
spicuous and specific than under the requirements of the prior law may
serve to embarrass a seller into refraining from exerting the full weight
of his economic power.
3 6
Section 2-316(2) requires a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability to mention merchantability and, in case of a written
disclaimer, to be conspicuous.37 To exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness (meaning presumably, and more precisely, any
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under section 2-315)
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. The language of
the section represents a watering down of the requirements set forth in
the 1952 Draft of the Code for a valid disclaimer of implied warranties
of fitness. Under that Draft any such disclaimer was required to be "in
specific language."38 Under the current version of the Code, enacted in
Wisconsin, all implied warranties of fitness may be excluded by lan-
guage, for example, to the effect that, "There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."3 9 The term "con-
spicuous" is defined in section 1-201 (10) of the Code which states as
follows: "A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it." This definition would seem adequate to dispose of small print; in
fact, the definitional section goes on to cite large type, or other type or
color contrasting with the surrounding material, as being "conspicuous."
Thus, the revisions of the 1952 Draft have resulted in a turning
away from a firm commitment to specificity of disclaimer. The require-
ment of specificity has been retained as to warranites of merchantability
under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-314, but, as to warranties
for a particular purpose under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-315,
38 Cf. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A. 2d 568 (1959)
(consequential property damages from truck accident allowed under Uni-
form Sales Act where parts' replacement warranty did not expressly dis-
claim implied warranties); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Company, 211 F.
Supp. 888, 891 (E. D. Pa. 1962) wherein the court said, "There was in this
case a written contract which purported to embody the entire agreement be-
tween the parties, but it did not specifically exclude the warranty of mer-
chantability hence that warranty was in effect." (Case decided under Uniform
Commercial Code 1952 Draft and involved, inter alia, damages for personal
injury, but manufacturer apparently did not rely on disclaimer).
3 An oral disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability is hard to conceive.
38 UNIFORM COMMERciAL CODE §2-316(2) (1952 Draft):
"Exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability
or of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific language and if the
inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity in the contract as a whole
it shall be resolved against the seller...
3 9 UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE §2-316 (2).
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the principle has been greatly diluted if not entirely washed out.4 ° How-
ever, the rule that merchantability must be mentioned, that disclaimers
of fitness must be in writing and that written disclaimers must be con-
spicuous all have their effect in increasing consumer protection.
These new Code provisions seem to require at least formal modi-
fications of existing disclaimer law in Wisconsin. In Hyland v. GCA
Tractor & Equipment Co.,41 involving the sale of equipment under lease
and conditional sales contract, the seller allegedly provided a 90-day
parts repair and replacement warranty. The warranty, in addition to
other language of disclaimer, contained a statement emphasized by the
court to the effect that, "This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties
expressed or implied .... -2 The court held that the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose was thereby effectively disclaimed and that no
liability going beyond the express terms of the agreement attached.
Under the Code, the issue in the Hyland case might be whether these
words of disclaimer were "conspicuous" within the meaning of section
1-201(10). The generality of the language of disclaimer would not
clearly be insufficient but would invite comparison with the sample
disclaimer in section 2-316(2) that, "There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
What effect the Code might have on such a case as Valley Refrigera-
tion Co. v. Lange,43 is more doubtful. In that case refrigeration equip-
ment was sold to fill a particular purpose, refrigerating a specified large
quantity of fish, and was so expressly warranted. The disclaimer clause
in the contract of sale provided that the writing contained all of the
agreements between the parties and that there were no other under-
standings or promises. The court held that the express warranty was
barred by the parol evidence rule and that in effect there was no implied
warranty (assuming that there could be one as to capacity) because
"nothing was left to implication. '4 4 But the court also indicated in
passing that the disclaimer clause in the contract effectively barred im-
plied warranties.4 5 A close reading of the case, therefore, indicates that
the implied warranty was excluded primarily by reason of the ex-
istence of the express warranty and that the disclaimer clause operated
40 See L. & N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 469 (1959),
wherein the court held under the 1952 Draft that a disclaimer to the effect
that the goods were sold "without warranty, guarantee or representations of
any kind or nature" and "without any express or implied warranties unless
written [on the contract] at the date of purchase" was not specific enough to
bar implied warranties (including both an alleged warranty of merchant-
ability and one of fitness) ; Del Duca, Commercial Code Litigation, 65 DICK.
L. REv. 287, 304-5 (1960).
41274 Wis. 586, 80 N.W. 2d 771 (1957).
42 Id. at 592, 80 N.W. 2d at 775.
4 Note 16 supra.
4 Id. at 471, 8 N.W. 2d at 297.
45 Id. at 473, 8 N.W. 2d at 298.
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predominantly to invoke the parol evidence rule against the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, as an express warranty.
The question whether an express warranty relating to the same sub-
ject matter as an implied warranty should be permitted to exclude the
latter has been variously decided in Wisconsin, but the more recent
cases, decided under the Uniform Sales Act, seem to indicate at least
that clear inconsistency between an express warranty and an implied
warranty would be required in order to exclude the latter.45 Section
2-317 of the Code does not alter this principle but provides, as a gov-
erning rule, that warranties shall be construed as consistent and cumu-
lative unless such a construction is "unreasonable," in which event the
intention of the parties is to determine which warranty is "dominant." 47
If the intention is not clear, the Code provides rules for its ascer-
tainment.48
The directive of section 2-317 that all warranties are to be preserved,
if possible, by a construction of consistency and cumulation and, if that
construction is unreasonable, by a determination of dominance of war-
46 UNIFORM SALF.s Acr §15(6), Wis. STAT. §121.15(6), first adopted in Wisconsin
in 1912 provides that, "An express warranty or condition does not negative
a warranty or condition implied under this act unless inconsistent there-
with." See Hellendbrand v. Bowar, 16 Wis. 2d 264, 114 N.W. 2d 418 (1962)(representation that mix was recommended but did not produce 100 percent
results held not inconsistent with the implied warranty of fitness for particu-
lar purpose of feeding sows); Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626, 633 (1871),
overruled on another point, 94 Wis. 251, 68 N.W. 1003 (1896) (alleged ex-
press warranties on some points did not exclude implied warranty of fitness).
Cf. J. I. Case Plow Works v. Niles & Scott Co., 90 Wis. 590, 63, N.W. 1013 (1895)
(express warranties excluded implied warranty of fitness) ; Dwight Bros.
Paper Co. v. Western Paper Co., 114 Wis. 414, 90 N.W. 444 (1902) (express
warranty excluded implied warranty of fitness); LaCrosse Plow Co. v.
Helgeson, 127 Wis. 622, 106 N.W. 1094 (1906) (express warranty excluded
implied warranty of fitness). See also L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa.
Super. 117, 146 A. 2d 154 (1958) (invoking the Uniform Commercial Code
to save the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in the face of a
purportedly exclusive warranty of merchantability); Corman, Implied Sales
Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis. L. Rxv. 219; The
Uniform Cantonercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under War-
ranty Latw, 49 Ky. L. J. 240, 258-259 (1960).
47 Section 2-317, of course, provides principles of construction as among all
warranties, whether express or implied. Thus, it may cover the case of the
construction of two express warranties as well as the case of an express
warranty and an implied warranty.
48"(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or
model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of
description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." [Emphasis added]
UNIFORM COMmERCIAL CODE §2-317(a). But "The [official] comments speci-
fically point out that the above rules [as to inconsistency and cumulation of
warranties] are to be applied only where factors making for an equitable
estoppel of the seller do not exist and the seller has in good faith obligated
himself, not knowing that the warranties are inconsistent. Where the intent
of the parties is clear from the circumstances surrounding the transaction,




ranties in accordance with 'the .intention of the parties, as fortified by
rules of construction, would serve to affect the result in certain Wis-
consin cases where the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
failed because of the operation of an express warranty. The rule of
section 2 -317(c) provides that an express warranty displaces an in-
consistent implied warranty other than an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. The policy underlying this provision is ap-
parently contrary, for example, to Dwight Bros. Paper Co. v. Western
Paper Co.4 9 which held that the express warranty that certain paper was
equal in quality and strength to the paper which the buyer was then
using excluded an implied warranty of fitness for use in a particular
process of making lace paper. Likewise, the policy of section 2-317
would be contrary to the rationale of J. I. Case Plow Works v. Niles &
Scott Co.50 wherein the court said:
The fact that the limited warranties going to the question of
suitableness of the wheels were expressed in the contract, by the
strongest implication, excludes and negatives the idea that it was
intended that other or more comprehensive warranties [such as
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose] should
exist, and repels any implication of law to that effect.5'
The facts of the J. I. Case Plow Works case, where the buyer al-
legedly furnished specifications, would, however, also require reference
to comment 9 of section 2-316 which states in part:
The situation in which the buyer gives precise and complete
specifications to the seller is not explicitly covered in this section,
but this is a frequent circumstance by which the implied warran-
ties may be excluded. The warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose would not normally arise since in such a situation there
is usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer.
Reference ought also to be made to comment 2 of section 2-315 which
states in part:
The provisions of this Article on the cumulation and conflict
of express and implied warranties must be considered on the
question of inconsistency between or among warranties. In such
a case any question of fact as to which warranty was intended
by the parties to apply must be resolved in favor of the warranty
of fitness for particular purpose as against all other warranties
except where the buyer has taken upon himself the responsibility
of furnishing the technical specifications. [Emphasis added]
Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co.52 presents a somewhat dif-
ferent problem since there the court held in effect that the warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose cannot be implied in law (and given the
49 Note 46 supra.50 Ibid.
51 Id. at 604, 63 N.W. at 1016.52 Note 16 supra.
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legal effect of such implication) if it is given specific oral expression
by the seller so as to assume the status of an express warranty. If it is
given such specific oral expression it becomes subject to exclusion under
the parol evidence rule. Thus the court reached the highly questionable
result that a seller helps his own case by giving oral expression to war-
ranties by which he might be bound if he remained silent. The policies
of sections 2-315, 2-316 and 2-317 of the Code would seem to militate
against this analysis, for in the Valley Refrigeration Co. case the implied
warranty of fitness was not only consistent with, it was identical to,
the parol warranty. In defense of the result, if not the analysis, it might
be pointed out that the opinion preliminarily indicates grave doubt
whether there could be an implied warranty of fitness with respect to
capacity of the refrigerating machinery.
Section 2-317 (a) (another of the intention-ascertaining rules)
provides that exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent
sample or model or general language of description. This provision is
without counterpart in the Uniform Sales Act or other prior Wisconsin
legislation but is consistent with the rule of section 236(c) of the Re-
statement of Contracts that, "where there is an inconsistency between
general provisions and specific provisions, the specific provisions ordi-
narily qualify the meaning of the general provisions. '53
Section 2-317(b) provides that a sample from an existing bulk dis-
places inconsistent language of description. This provision may change
the rule of Uniform Sales Act, section 14,54 to the extent that the prior
statutory provision, in certain cases, required conformity to both the
sample and the description. 55 Before drawing too many such mechanical
conclusions, however, one must bear in mind that subsections 2-317(a),
(b) and (c) are subject to the guiding principle of the section that
warranties are to be construed, wherever possible, as consistent and
cumulative and, if this result is not reasonable, dominance of the war-
ranties is to be determined according to the intention of the parties.56
Wisconsin law apparently is not changed by section 2-316(3) (a) of
the Code pertaining to traditional commercial language of general dis-
claimer of implied warranties such as "as is" or "with all faults." In
53 See Honnold, supra note 13. at 411; cf. Spencer v. Holman, 113 Wis. 340,
89 N.W. 132 (1902); Thomsen-Abbott Construction Co. v. Wausau, 9 Wis.
2d 225, 100 N.W. 2d 921 (1960).
54 Wis. STAT. §121.14 (1961).
55 Cf. Rappaport v. Boyer & Gilfillan Motor Co., 239 Minn. 477, 59 N.W. 2d
302 (1953) ; Honnold, supra note 13, at 411.
56 Official Comment 3 to §2-317 states as follows:
"The rules in subsections (a), (b) and (c) are designed to ascertain
the intention of the parties by reference to the factor which probably claimed
the attention of the parties in the first instance. These rules are not absolute
but may be changed by evidence showing that the conditions which existed




the Hyland5 7 case (where warranties were found to have been ex-
cluded), in addition to other disclaimer language emphasized by the
court, the contract contained a provision that "The lessee. .. takes and
accepts the leased property in its present 'as is' condition and state of
repair."55
Section 2-316(3) (b), pertaining to exclusion of implied warranties
through the buyer's inspection, requires either examination by the
buyer or a refusal to examine. The Official Comment explains that
refusal requires not only availability of the goods but a demand by the
seller that the buyer examine them. This interpretation does not appear
to be inconsistent with existing lawA9
Section 2-316(3)(c) providing for exclusion or modification of
warranties by course of dealing, course of performance or usage of
trade is also consistent with the Uniform Sales Act, section 71, Wis.
Stat. 121.71.60
III. Disclaimer of Implied Warranties: The Policy
As previously indicated, the main thrust of the provisions of the
Code relating to exclusion and modifications of implied warranties is
to make such disclaimers clear and conspicuous. The scheme is based,
for the most part, on an assumption of freedom of contract, and the
attempt is made to require full and fair disclosure within the context
of freedom of contract. In some recent cases, and notably in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.61 (a pre-Code case), courts have refused to
enforce certain disclaimers of implied warranties and in doing so have
faced up openly and directly to the problem of gross disparity in bargain-
ing power between buyer and seller as this is reflected in the "form
contract" or so-called contract of adhesion.62 Such cases are to be dis-
tinguished from certain leading Wisconsin disclaimer cases such as
Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co.6 3 where such gross disparity did
not appear to exist. In the Henningsen case, on the other hand, the
court said that (at the time of decision of the case) there was no real
competition among automobile manufacturers as to the terms of the
warranties offered to buyers (the warranty offered was a standard
manufacturer's warranty of parts' repair or replacement, within ninety
5 Note 41 supra.
55 Id. at 591, 80 N.W. 2d at 775. It is arguable whether, under the Code, language
under §316 (3) (a), such as "as is," must be "conspicuous."
59 UNIFORM SALES AcT §15(3), Wis. STAT. §121.15(3); cf. T. B. Scott Lumber
Co. v. Hafner-Lothman Mfg. Co., 91 Wis. 667, 65 N.W. 513 (1895); Boothby
v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626 (1871), overruled on another point, 94 Wis. 251, 68
N.W. 1003 (1896); Hennig v. Iron Ridge Canning Co., 186 Wis. 499, 202
N.W. 466 (1925); Prime Mfg. Co. v. Allen-Hough Carryola Co., 210 Wis.
72, 245 N.W. 70 (1933).
60 WIS. STAT. §121.71 (1961) ; see Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., supra note 31.
6132 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1959).
62See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedo-m of
Contract, 43 COL. L. REv. 629 (1943).
63 Note 16 supra.
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days or 4000 miles, and disclaimer of all other warranties). Hence,
buyers having no real choice in the matter were forced to accept unfair
warranty bargains to which they should not be held. The court, there-
fore, allowed recovery for personal injuries attributable to a mechani-
cal defect, in the face of a disclaimer of implied warranties . 4
The Henningsen65 case seems forthrightly to adopt and turn upon
the principle of unconscionability now expressly incorporated in the
Commercial Code. The Code, itself, however, makes no provision in sec-
tion 2-316 for unfairness of disclaimers resulting from disparity of
bargaining power (unless such disclaimers fail to provide the notice
required by the section) and, as previously noted, the Official Comments
to section 2-302 disavow an intent to deal directly with the problem of
imbalance of bargaining power 6 To the extent, however, that the Hen-
ningsen problem was construed as one of exclusion of consequential
damages for personal injury, the provisions of section 2-719(3) might
be invoked to hold such a limitation prima facie unconscionable. But
in form at least the disclaimer as to implied warranties, strikes at the
creation of the warranty rather than at the damages for its breach.
As to the express warranty, section 2-719(3) would seem to support
the Henningsen result (although breach of express warranty was not
pleaded in that case) since there the manufacturer warranted "each
new motor vehicle ... chassis or parts ... to be free from defects in
material or workmanship . . ." but limited its "obligation" under the
warranty. Assuming that a causal connection between a defect in the
warranted goods and the consequential damages for personal injury
can be shown, the warranty restriction may be construed as one of
remedy rather than as going to the creation of the express warranty67
Obviously, any general statutory provision expressly purporting to
affect or modify the allocation of risks because of disparity of bargaining
power would be exceedingly difficult to draft and would necessarily
destroy, or seriously impair, freedom of contract where the latter serves
a worthwhile purpose. Such legislation having this purpose as does
exist, pertains to the sale of specific products. Thus a North Dakota
statute provides that the purchasers of certain kinds of farm machinery
may rescind their contracts of sale within a reasonable time after de-
livery if such machinery does not prove reasonably fit for the purpose
for which it was purchased, and that any contractual provision to the
contrary is against public policy. 8
64 See Note, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 607 (1961); Note, 74 HAgv. L. REv. 630 (1961)
Note, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW 233 (1961) ; Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 453 (1961);
Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 494 (1950).
65 Note 61 supra.
66See note 9 supra.
67 Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson Weber, 252 Iowa 1289,
110 N.W. 2d 449 (1961) where the Henningsen doctrine was extended to a
subrogated property damage claim.
68 10 N. D. CEN. CODE §51-07-04; Note, 23 MINN. L. REv. 784 (1939).
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Public policy also precludes disclaimer of liability for a sale in
breach of a penal statute."9 Presumably the Code would not change this
result.
Apart from the question of disparity of bargaining power, the Hen-
ningsen70 case lays considerable stress upon the failure of the disclaimer
in question to provide adequate notice to the buyer that by accepting the
disclaimer he was relinquishing any personal injury claim that might
flow from the use of a defective automobile, and to mold the buyer's
expectation accordingly.71 Thus the court said:
In the context of this warranty, only the abandonment of all sense
of justice would permit us to hold that, as a matter of law, the
phrase 'its obligation under this warranty being limited to making
good at its factory any part or parts thereof' signifies to an ordi-
nary reasonable person that he is relinquishing any personal in-
jury claim that might flow from the use of a defective automo-
bile. Such claims are nowhere mentioned. The draftsmanship is
reflective of the care and skill of the Automobile Manufacturers
Association in undertaking to avoid warranty obligations without
drawing too much attention to its effort in that regard. No one
can doubt that if the will to do so were present, the ability to in-
form the buying public of the intention to disclaim liability for
injury claims arising from breach of warranty would present no
problem.7 2
To be fair, a disclaimer of implied warranties must adequately in-
form buyers of the risks to be incurred (i.e. "mold the expectations"
of buyers), and the Code has, despite some alteration in language since
its original promulgation, effected an improvement upon prior law by
its detailed provisions regarding the form and style of disclaimers. In
themselves these provisions mount no direct attack upon the problems
inherent in disparity of bargaining power in mass marketing but indi-
rectly they have their effect in this broader area.
An interesting recent case of effective disclaimer of implied war-
ranties under the Code is Roto-Lith, Lt. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co. 73 an
action for damages on account of alleged defects in certain adhesive
emulsions used in the production of a cellophane adhesive. The buyer's
order was for "N-132-C" emulsion and stated, "End use: wet pack
spinach bags" (thereby presumably providing a basis for a warranty of
fitness). The acknowledgement of the order and the invoice bore on
69 In Metz v. Medford Fur Foods, Inc., 4 Wis. 2d 96, 90 N.W. 2d 106 (1958),
buyer's agreement to hold seller harmless from liability arising from use of
seller's mink food was held void as against public policy established by
criminal statute forbidding the sale of adulterated food. Note, 1960 Wis. L.
REv. 337; 6 A CoRBIN, CONTRACrS §1471 (1st ed. 1962).
70 Note 61 supra,
71 See' Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimer and War-
ranties, 4 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 285, 306-308 (1963).
72 Note 61 supra, 161 A. 2d at 93.
73 297 F. 2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
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their face in (what the court characterized as) "conspicuous" type the
following legend: "All goods sold without warranties, express or im-
plied, and subject to the terms on the reverse side." In somewhat smaller
but still "conspicuous" type, certain terms of sale were printed on the
back, including a limitation of seller's liability to replacement of non-
conforming goods, a merger clause, a disclaimer of warranties and a
condition that the buyer give notice if such terms were unacceptable.
These provisions were held to be binding on the buyer (though not
contained in its order) and to constitute a sufficient disclaimer of all
warranties. It may be noted that the Roto-Lith case, and many cases
like it, including certain Wisconsin cases, such as Valley Refrigeration
Co. v. Lange Co.,7 4 do not involve evident disparity in bargaining power
since the buyers in these cases are not individual consumers purchasing
in a mass market from sellers of great economic power. Rather the
buyers are commercial enterprises possessed of more than nominal
economic power and presumably having some business sophistication,
even though in some cases they may have bound themselves to printed
form contracts. Obviously, where the buyer is thus apparently advan-
taged, the principle of freedom of contract is more realistically ap-
plicable.7 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, has, therefore,
modified the prior Wisconsin law of exclusion or modification of war-
ranty and limitation of remedy for breach of warranty in the following
principal respects:
74 Note 16 supra.
75 Cf. Norway v. Root, 58 Wash. 2d 96, 361 P. 2d 162 (1961) (by way of
dictum, sympathy expressed for Henningson rationale) ; Knecht v. Universal
Motor Co., 113 N.W. 2d 688 (N. D. 1962) (implied automobile warranties
may be expressly disclaimed so as to defeat action for rescission) ; Boehck
Const. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, Inc., 121 N.W. 2d 303 (Wis. 1963)
(agreement by lessee to hold lessor harmless from third party claims does
not disclaim implied warranty of fitness) ; Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331
Mich. 576, 50 N.W. 2d 162 (1951) (disclaimer of implied warranties should be
strictly construed) ; Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927)(language of disclaimer strictly construed so as to preserve implied war-
ranties) ; Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 31, (warranty of merchant-
ability not specifically excluded) ; Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club,
176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A. 2d 202 (1955) (general disclaimer which did not
expressly disclaim implied warranties held insufficient under the Sales Act to
disclaim warranty of fitness for the general purpose); Moss v. Gardner,
228 Ark. 828, 310 S.W. 2d 491 (1958) (disclaimer of implied warranties re-
luctantly held valid); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber,
supra note 60, (Henningsen case followed in situation involving a subrogated
property damage claim); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App.
438, 338 S.W. 2d 655 (cert. den., Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1960) (limitation of liability
and disclaimer of warranties in sale of automobile held insufficient to protect
manufacturer in suit for consequential damages); Hall, Article 2-Sales-
"Front Status to Contract?", 1952 Wis. L. REv. 209; Schaffer, Sales War-
ranties in Illinois: Commercial Code and Pre-Code Law, 39 CHI-KENT L. REV.
93 (1962) ; 2 HIARER & JAMES, ToRTs §28.25 (1st ed. 1956).
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1. Where the parol evidence rule is not an issue, disclaimer of an
express warranty has been made even more difficult than under the
prior law (although there are few Wisconsin cases in point beside the
"seed" cases).
2. The parol evidence rule has been liberalized and, hence, exclusion
and disclaimer of parol warranties and other extrinsic matters made
more difficult.
3. Written disclaimers of the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for the particular purpose are required to be "conspicuous"
and hence more clearly notify the buyer and "mold his expectations"
as to the risks of the purchase; but, with respect to specificity, the pro-
visions regarding disclaimer of warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose are less stringent than those affecting merchantability.
4. Provisions as to multiple warranties covering the same subject
matter have been liberalized to the benefit of the buyer and allow con-
sideration of the intention of the parties, thereby discouraging mechani-
cal application of rules.
5. The concept of unconscionability may be expressly applied to
any sales problem and is particularly applicable to matters of disclaimer
or limitation of warranty and limitation of remedy.
6. To the extent that a contract provision purports not to prevent
creation of a warranty but rather to limit damages for its breach, there
is a presumption of unconscionability as to such limitation, in the case
of consumer goods, insofar as it pertains to damages for personal in-
jury.
Although changes in warranty law have not been revolutionary and
in most important respects the new scheme reaches the same results as
have been evolving under the case law of the Sales Act, the desire of
the Code draftsmen to conform the law to commercial practice and to
increase consumer protection has found firm and, for the most part,
effective expression.
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